Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2012

State of Utah v. Irene Garcia : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark Shurtleff; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Debra M. Nelson; Brenda M. Viera; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Irene Garcia : Brief of Appellant, No. 20120147 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2012).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3045

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

IRENE GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20120147-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellant Irene Garcia appeals from a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment for a
conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007); in the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Vernice
Trease, presiding.
DEBRA M. NELSON (9176)
BRENDA M. VIERA (8820)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 3 0 m

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee

IRENE GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

CaseNo.20120147-CA
Appellant is incarcerated.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appellant Irene Garcia appeals from a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment for a
conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007); in the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Vernice
Trease, presiding.
DEBRA M. NELSON (9176)
BRENDA M. VIERA (8820)
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

MARK SHURTLEFF (4666)
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Hi

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION

1

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

8

ARGUMENT

9

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE
MARSHALED EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT GARCIA WAS
GUILTY OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE

9

A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict

10

B. The Evidence Presented Was Not Sufficient To Show That
Ms. Garcia Distributed or Arranged To Distribute A Controlled
Substance

13

C. In the Alternative, Ms. Garcia's Conviction Should Be Overturned
for Plain Error

17

CONCLUSION

19

Addendum A: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, 217 P.3d 733

10

State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, 25 P.3d 985

9, 10

State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, 989 P.2d 1091

10

State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, 95 P.3d 276

18

State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, 20 P.3d 888

18

State v. Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)

11

State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,2P.3d954

9, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17

State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979)

11,13

State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, 3 P.3d 725 (abrogated on other grounds
by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246, 2001 WL 911418)
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 10 P.3d 346

11

2, 3, 9, 17, 18, 19

State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985)

17

State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, 993 P.2d 232

9

State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, 236 P.3d 155

10

State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187

2

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983)

2

State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94

2

West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)

10

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2007)

1

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2010)

3, 11

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2010)

3
iii

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2008)...

iv

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee
v.

:

IRENE GARCIA,

:

Case No. 20120147-CA

:

Appellant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellant Irene Garcia appeals from a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment for a
conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007); in the Third
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Vernice
Trease, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). R.17577.
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue: Whether there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to show
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly and intentionally distributed or
arranged to distribute a controlled substance.

Standard of Review: In sufficiency of the evidence cases, this Court will "review the
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^[15, 63 P.3d 94. It
"will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." Id. (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this
Court has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does
not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap
in order to sustain a verdict.
Id. (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-445).
Preservation: Ms. Garcia preserved this issue by making a motion for a directed verdict.
R.191: 202-03; see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 14, 10 P.3d 346 (uAs a general
rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant
must request that the court do so."). Specifically, trial counsel argued in her motion for a
directed verdict that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Ms. Garcia had the
intent required to show she intentionally and knowingly distributed or arranged to
distribute a controlled substance. R. 191:202-203. See State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187,
^5 ("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be .. . specifically raised such that
the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court... [so as
2

to give] the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate,
correct it.9'). Although Ms. Garcia preserved this issue, if this Court finds preservation
inadequate, it can be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
m 12-15.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on appeal.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2010)
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to
the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds
the act is committed:
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An Information was filed December 17, 2010, charging Ms. Garcia with
Distributing/Offering/Arranging the Distribution of a Controlled Substance, afirstdegree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)(2010). R.1-3. A preliminary
hearing was held February 10, 2011, binding Ms. Garcia over on the charged offense.
R.30-31.
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A jury trial was held on October 24, 2011. R.128-30; 191. After the State rested
its case, Ms. Garcia made the court aware she would be making a motion for a directed
verdict. R. 191:187. After Ms. Garcia's witness testified, counsel made a motion for a
directed verdict, which was denied. R.191:202-203. The jury returned a guilty verdict on
the charged offense. R.164; 191:254. Ms. Garcia's conviction was subject to the
statutory enhancement under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(b)(i) and filed a 402 Motion
to strike the enhancement. R. 167-170. The trial court granted Ms. Garcia's 402 Motion.
R.175. Ms. Garcia was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years to
life in the Utah State prison, suspended, and 365 days in the Salt Lake County Jail.
R.175.
Ms. Garcia filed a timely appeal. R. 178-179.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Pioneer Park, located at 350 West and 400 South in Salt Lake County, is situated
near various neighborhoods, urban attractions, and community services catering to low
income individuals. R.191:141-2; 214-15. The Wiggam Center is within a block of the
park and offers resources to Hispanic individuals attempting to find employment.
R.191:154; 190-191. Looking to obtain a copy of her birth certificate needed to attain
employment, Ms. Garcia sought assistance from the Wiggam Center. R.191:190.
On December 9, 2010, sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Ms. Garcia
sipped coffee with her niece—a morning routine they shared. R. 191:189-91. Ms.
Garcia's niece, Cynthia Nicole Garcia ("Cynthia"), lived in the apartment above her
home, and they saw each other on a daily basis. R.191:189. On that morning, the two
4

women discussed their plans for the day. R. 191:190. Visibly in a good mood, Ms. Garcia
told Cynthia that she planned to ride her bicycle to the Wiggam Center to check on the
status of her birth certificate. R. 191:190-191. Ms. Garcia was looking for full-time
employment and Cynthia had helped her apply online for two warehouse jobs looking to
hire. R.191:192. Ms. Garcia did not mention that she was going to stop anywhere along
the way, and planned to hurry home so she and Cynthia could go Christmas shopping
later that morning. R. 191:189-193. Cynthia testified that her aunt left her home around
9:30 a.m. and did not plan to be gone for too long—as the Wiggam Center was only a
fifteen to twenty minute bike ride away from their home—and planned to return within
anhour.R.191:191; 193.
While most individuals frequent Pioneer Park to enjoy its amenities or travel
through it to reach a surrounding destination, the Park is also known to be a high drug
trafficking area. R.191:141; 214-215. Consequently, narcotics Detective Christopher
Johnson often worked in the Park in an undercover capacity. R. 191:141.
On December 9, 2010, at some time between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., Detective
Johnson arrived at Pioneer Park. R.191:141-142; 162. The detective, who was working
undercover at the time, walked inward toward the thickest concentration of people.
R. 191:161 -162. North of the bathroom area at the center of the park, Detective Johnson
noticed Ms. Garcia circling on her bike. R.191:161-162. While he could not recall
whether Ms. Garcia was communicating with anyone else, Detective Johnson testified
that she was in the company of three to five other individuals. R.191:161-162. Ms.
Garcia first approached Detective Johnson on her bike while the other individuals were
5

five to fifteen feet away—though feasibly closer according to the detective's testimony.
R.191:163.
In the area northwest of the bathrooms, Ms. Garcia stopped her bike and
approached the detective. R. 191:163. It is not certain what Ms. Garcia first asked
Detective Johnson. R.191:165; 167. At the preliminary hearing held on February 10,
2011, the detective recalled that Ms. Garcia inquired "What are you looking for?" R.130131; R. 191:165. At trial, over eight months later, Detective Johnson testified that she
asked "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" R.191:143; 165.
Though the transmitter worn by Detective Johnson was capable of recording the
exchange, audio and/or video technology it was not used as a part of the operation to
confirm the precise language spoken. R.191:152-153. Relying on his experience as an
undercover narcotics detective, Detective Johnson stated that it is common for individuals
to explicitly ask "Do you want drugs?" R.191:178. However, he testified that an
ambiguous phrase such as "What do you want?" "What do you need?" or "What are you
looking for?" was sufficient to suggest Ms. Garcia was offering an opportunity to
purchase drugs. R. 191:166.
In response to Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry, the detective responded that he needed
"40 white." R.191:143. Detective Johnson spoke only in slang and never explicitly said
"cocaine" in Ms. Garcia's presence. R.191:143; 176. During this initial exchange, two
women meandered nearby, ambling closer at some points, and farther away at other
points. R.191:164-165. Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms. Garcia and
these two women interacted. R. 191:165.
6

After the detective requested "40 white," Ms. Garcia gestured with her hand and
shouted "quarenta"—meaning "40" in Spanish—in the direction of a Hispanic man
standing approximately 25-30 feet away. R.191:143-44. At this time, several individuals
were in the same vicinity at various indeterminate locations. R.191:167. Taking
precaution, Detective Johnson watched intently as the Hispanic man approached.
R.191:168. As the Hispanic gentlemen proceeded toward him, the detective testified that
Ms. Garcia stood straddling her bike while in the presence of several other individuals.
R.191:169. These individuals stood only a few feet away from the detective, and
watched the transaction. R. 191:169. Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms.
Garcia interacted with the onlookers during this time. R. 191:169.
After being handed two prerecorded twenty dollar bills, the Hispanic man spit out
two small twists of cocaine and passed them to the detective. R. 191:170. Following the
exchange, Ms. Garcia, the Hispanic male, and Detective Johnson exited the park in
separate directions. R. 191:171. Beyond the gesture and "quarenta" statement, Detective
Johnson observed no further interaction between Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male.
R.191:174. Additionally, Ms. Garcia and the detective shared no further contact.
R.191:171; 174. Detective Johnson testified that "middlemen" commonly arrange drug
deals to receive certain benefits—either to collect money for facilitating the transaction,
or to receive a share of the drugs from the purchase. R.191:146. Ms. Garcia did not ask
the detective for any money or drugs following the transaction. R.191:146-147; 174.
When Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male were at a safe distance away, Detective
Johnson executed the bust signal in order to prompt supporting officers to arrest the
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suspects. R. 191:147; 171. The Hispanic male was arrested east of the park on 400 South
with the pre-recorded twenty dollar bills found on his person. R. 191:172-173.
Meanwhile, the police arrested Ms. Garcia northwest of the park at 240 South and 400
West. R. 191:173; 175. The Wiggam Center, also positioned northwest of the park, was
only a short distance away from her arrest location. R. 191:191. No prerecorded bills or
drugs were recovered from Ms. Garcia. R. 191:174-175.
About five minutes after her arrest, Detective Johnson identified Ms. Garcia
before she was booked into jail. R.191:176. Cynthia testified that she received a call
from her aunt, who was already in jail, at approximately 11:00 a.m. or 11:15 a.m.
R.191:193. Later that afternoon, Detective Johnson drafted a report describing the events
that surrounded Ms. Garcia's arrest. R.191:177.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse Ms. Garcia's conviction where the marshaled evidence
establishes the State failed to meet its burden. The evidence presented failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly and intentionally arranged to
distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, the insufficiency of the evidence constituted plain
error, which should have been obvious to the trial court, the absence of which was
reasonably likely to produce a more favorable outcome for Ms. Garcia.
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ARGUMENT
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE MARSHALED
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE
DOUBT THAT GARCIA WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE.
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when" it concludes
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v.
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^[10, 2 P.3d 954 (citation and quotation omitted). It will
"view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," and "will reverse only if
the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes.'" Id.
(citations and quotations omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the
evidence "is high," however, "it is not impossible." Id. (citations omitted). This Court
"will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. (citations and
quotations omitted). "Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In other words, "[t]o affirm the
jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient to
support all elements of the charged crime." Id. (citation and quotation omitted); see also
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 18; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^[17, 993 P.2d 232.
When raising an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant "must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^j 13,
25 P.3d 985 (citations and quotations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the challenger
to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
9

introduced which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v.
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original); see
also State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106,ffl[16-17, 236 P.3d 155. "After constructing this
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315; see also Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT
App233,1J20n.5,2l7P.3d733.
As it reviews the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier of
fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 % 16. Thus, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops." Id. Instead, this Court will simply
"assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." Id. (quotations and
citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ^ 30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may
not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict'").
As demonstrated below, the marshaled evidence shows that the State presented
insufficient evidence to show Garcia knowingly and intentionally arranged to distribute a
controlled substance.
A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict
Under Utah law distribution or arrangement to distribute a controlled substance is
defined in part as follows:
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly and intentionally:...
10

(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance.
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (2010). "To make out a prima facie case under the statute,
the State must show that an offer, agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute
controlled substances was made by the defendant and, whichever variation or variations it
charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution
would, or would be likely to, occur."' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, If 9, 3 P.3d 725
{abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246, 2001 WL
911418), citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979); see also State v.
Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "[I]f [s]he intends the distribution
for sale of a controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement therefor
constitutes the criminal offense described by the statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924;
State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986).
Here, the marshaled evidence was "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Ms.Garcia intended to
arrange the distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^| 10
(quotation omitted). Detective Johnson testified that he arrived undercover at Pioneer
Park on December 9, 2010 between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. R.191:141142; 162. Meanwhile, Ms. Garcia's niece, Cynthia Nicole Garcia, testified that her aunt
left her home at 850 Roberta Street around 9:30 a.m. that same morning. R.191:191.
Before leaving, Ms. Garcia informed her niece that she planned to ride her bicycle to the
Wiggam Center to check on the status of her birth certificate. R.191:190-191. She further
11

testified that Ms. Garcia was in a hurry to return home because the women had plans to
go Christmas shopping later that morning. R. 191:192-193.
In the center of the park, Detective Johnson first noticed Ms. Garcia circling on
her bike amongst three to five other individuals in the area. R. 191:161-162. The detective
could not recall if Ms. Garcia was communicating with these individuals. R. 191:161-162.
Ms. Garcia initiated contact with Detective Johnson and made an indeterminate inquiry.
R. 191:163. At the preliminary hearing, Detective Johnson recalled that Ms. Garcia asked
"What are you looking for?" while at trial he testified that she inquired "Flow much do
you need?" or "How much do you want?" R.130-131; R.191:143; 165. During their first
encounter, two women were nearby and moved closer at some points, and farther away at
other points. R. 191:164-165.
The detective assumed that Ms. Garcia was indirectly offering drugs, and
responded in slang that he needed "40 white." R. 191:143. Following his request, Ms.
Garcia gestured with her hand and shouted "quarenta"—meaning "40" in Spanish—in the
direction of a Hispanic man standing 25-30 feet away. R. 191:143-44. The detective
testified that there were other people in the area of the Hispanic male, but he could not
recall if anyone stood between Ms. Garcia and this man. R. 191:167. The Hispanic man
approached, and Detective Johnson handed him two prerecorded twenty dollar bills.
R.191:170. The man spat out two small twists of cocaine and handed them to the
detective. R.191:170. During the transaction, Ms. Garcia stood straddling her bike whilst
in the company of several other observers who stood a few feet away. R. 191:169.
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Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms. Garcia interacted with the onlookers.
R.191:169.
Subsequently, Ms. Garcia, the Hispanic male, and Detective Johnson exited the
park in separate directions and shared no further contact. R.191:171; 174. The Hispanic
male was arrested east of the park on 400 South with the pre-recorded twenty dollar bills
found in his possession. R. 191:172-173. Ms. Garcia was arrested a half a block away
from the Wiggam Center at 240 South and 400 West. R. 191:173; 175. At the time of her
arrest, the police did not find any drugs or prerecorded bills on Ms. Garcia's person.
R.191:174-175.
B. The Evidence Presented Was Not Sufficient To Show That Ms. Garcia Distributed
or Arranged To Distribute A Controlled Substance.
In order for the State to sustain a conviction for a first degree felony it had to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly or intentionally committed
some "act in furtherance of an arrangement" to distribute a controlled substance.
Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. The marshaled evidence, however, was so "inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt"
that Ms. Garcia knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a controlled
substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, If 10 (citations and quotations omitted).
The evidence is insufficient to prove that Ms. Garcia had the requisite knowledge
or intent because it requires a "speculative leap[] across [a] gap[] in the evidence."
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ 10. Specifically, there is no evidence to support that Ms.
Garcia knew "40 white" was slang for cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic male dealt
13

illegal drugs. Instead, the evidence suggests that Ms. Garcia had no relationship with the
Hispanic male, and was merely solicited to translate for unknown individuals while
traveling through the park to the Wiggam Center.
When Detective Johnson first noticed Ms. Garcia circling on her bike, she was in
the company of three to five other individuals. R.191:161-162. However, the detective
was unable recall if she was talking with these other people. R.191:161-162. When Ms.
Garcia asked the detective either "What are you looking for?" "How much do you need?"
or "How much do you want?" two women moved around them—walking closer at some
points, and farther away at other points. R.191:164-165. These actions cast doubt on any
assumption that the women were uninterested bystanders. While Ms. Garcia queried in
English, she translated the detective's request for "40 white" into Spanish. R.191:143144. Because the detective did not mention drugs or cocaine in Ms. Garcia's presence,
there was no opportunity for her to equate "40 white" with cocaine. R.191:143; 176. As
the Hispanic male handed the cocaine to the Detective, several individuals stood in place
merely a few feet away. R.191:169. At this point, "reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt" that these other individuals were uninvolved in the
transaction. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, *| 10. Instead, this evidence suggests that Ms.
Garcia was acting as a translator for these unknown individuals, and was only parroting
words without understanding the illicit meaning of "40 white."
Further, other than calling "quarenta" and gesturing in the Hispanic male's general
direction, there is no evidence that Ms. Garcia and this man shared any relationship. After
the exchange was complete, Ms. Garcia, the Detective, and the Hispanic male departed in
14

separate directions. R. 191:171. Additionally, Ms. Garcia demonstrated indifference to the
Hispanic male and the entire transaction in general. Supporting evidence shows that she
remained on her bike for the duration of the encounter, left the park immediately after the
exchange, and did not ask the Detective for a share of money or drugs for facilitating the
transaction. R.191:169; 171; 174.
Lastly, the temporal and locational specifics do not lend support to the assumption
that Ms. Garcia knew the Hispanic male, and traveled to Pioneer Park to arrange a drug
deal with him that morning. Ms. Garcia left her house around 9:30 am to check on the
status of her birth certificate at the Wiggam Center. R. 191:190-191. In a hurry to return
for a Christmas shopping engagement with her niece, Ms. Garcia rode her bicycle though
Pioneer Park— a convenient short cut to the Wiggam Center from her home at 850
Roberta Street. R. 191:191-193. Furthermore, after the transaction was complete, Ms.
Garcia was arrested only a half a block from her destination. R. 191:191; 173; 175. In
light of the facts above, reasonable minds would have had a reasonable doubt that Ms.
Garcia knew the meaning of "40 white," and knew the Hispanic male was a drug dealer.
Alternatively, even if Ms. Garcia was not acting as a translator, reasonable minds
would still entertain a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knew "40 white" was a code
word for cocaine and knew the Hispanic man was a drug dealer. Namely, the State
required the jury to speculate that Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry was an offer to purchase
drugs, and that she specifically intended to gesture the Hispanic male over.
First, reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia
intentionally offered the Detective an opportunity to purchase drugs. Though the
15

exchange was limited to three short phrases—"40 white," "quarenta," and Ms. Garcia's
unknown initial inquiry—Detective Johnson was not able to recall what Ms. Garcia asked
when she first approached him. R.191:143-144; 165. Instead, the jury was forced to rely
on the Detective's faded recollections of the dialog. At the preliminary hearing, the
detective recalled that Ms. Garcia asked "What are you looking for?" R.130-131;
R. 191:165. At trial, over eight months later, Detective Johnson testified that she asked
"How much do you need," or "How much do you want?" R. 191:143; 165. The two
phrases carry drastically different meanings in context. "What are you looking for?" is an
innocuous inquiry, and an appropriate question to ask a stranger who appears confused.
Meanwhile, the phrases "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" are
more indicative of an offer to purchase drugs and could support a reasonable inference
that Ms. Garcia understood the meaning of "40 white." Instead of clarifying the nature of
Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry, the State required the jury to make a "speculative leap" over
this gap in the evidence. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^j 10.
Second, the jury was not provided with the evidence required to formulate a
reasonable inference that Ms. Garcia intended to summon the Hispanic male over. There
is no evidence that Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male knew each other or had any contact
prior to or after the transaction. R.191:174. Also, the Detective was unable to recall
whether anyone stood in between Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic man when "quarenta" was
called and the gesture was made. R. 191:167. However, he did testify that there were
people in the immediate vicinity. R. 191:167. Here, the jury was required to speculate that
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Ms.Garcia intended to signal the Hispanic male and not one of the other individuals also
in the same area.
The evidence presented by the State supporting the arranging to distribute a
controlled substance charge was so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [Ms. Garcia] committed
the crime." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, U 10 (quotation omitted). Because the State did
not prove that Ms. Garcia formed the requisite knowledge or intent to arrange a drug
transaction, the State failed to "prove [the] criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt." State
v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985). Specifically, the State failed to prove that Ms.
Garcia understood "40 white" to mean cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic male dealt
cocaine. Therefore, Ms. Garcia's conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled
substance should be reversed.
C. In the Alternative, Ms. Garcia's Conviction Should Be Overturned for Plain Error.
It was plain error to allow Ms. Garcia's conviction on obviously insufficient
evidence. The plain error doctrine can serve as an alternative to an insufficiency of the
evidence claim when the claim is not preserved at trial. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11. It
"enables the appellate court to balance the need for procedural regularity with the
demands of fairness" and "to avoid injustice." Id. f 13 (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our
confidence in the verdict is undermined.
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Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
First, Ms. Garcia's conviction was based on insufficient evidence, as argued
above, which constitutes error. Id. ^ 17. Second, this error was uso obvious and
fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. ^ 18. Here, the case
law was well settled that the State can prove intent through circumstantial evidence, as
long as there was "sufficient evidence, including . . . inferences that could be drawn
therefrom," that the defendant possessed the requisite intent. Id,ffl|21-22. However, such
inferences must "have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience." Id. TJ 21. As set
forth above, the State's evidence required the inference that Ms. Garcia understood what
the term "40 white" to mean cocaine, and, conveyed that understanding by translating
that term in Spanish and gesturing to the Hispanic man. Given the evidence, this
inference is contrary to "logic and reasonable human experience." Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
121.
For the reasons argued above, it should have been obvious to the trial court that
the inferences drawn by the State's insufficient evidence lacked a basis in logic and
human experience necessary to prove Ms. Garcia's intent. Lastly, the error was harmful
and "of such a magnitude that there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for [Ms. Garcia]." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, U 16, 20 P.3d 888. An error is harmful if it
is prejudicial, and the error is prejudicial if but for the trial court's allowance of
insufficient evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See State v.
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 22, 95 P.3d 276. Clearly, but for the trial court's allowance of
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insufficient evidence by the State, the result of the proceeding would have been very
different for Ms. Garcia. Had the trial court recognized this error, it would have
"forthwith order[ed the defendant] discharged." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 15.
For these reasons, the court committed plain error with regard to the insufficiency
of the evidence against Ms. Garcia.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court
reverse her conviction for distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance.
SUBMITTED this ^ 0

day of July, 2012.

DEBRA M. NELSON
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC 1st Degree Felony
- Disposition: 12/13/2011 Guilty
HEARING
Court hears arguments on Defendant's 402 Motion. Court grants 402
reduction and strike the prior history enhancement.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than
five years and which may be life in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE
DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
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SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE
No ankle monitor release; no credit for time served; no good time.
Attorney Pees
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant to serve 365 day(s) jail.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by Adult Probation and
Parole.
ZERO TOLERANCE PROBATION.
If supervised by Adult Probation and Parole: all fines, fees and/or
restitution are to be paid directly to Adult Probation and Parole.
Pay monthly supervision fee as determined by probation agency.
Pay recoupment fee (attorney fees) as ordered.
Violate no laws.
Complete community service hours as directed by probation officer.
Undergo assessment to determine appropriate counseling. Enter and
successfully complete any recommended treatment.
Enter, participate-in, and complete any program, counseling or
treatment as directed by probation agency.
The Court requires defendant to make adequate progress in
treatment, regardless of fault. Failure to make adequate progress
could result in an Order to Show Cause.
Enter into and successfully complete the CATS Program.
Comply with all standard drug and alcohol conditions imposed by
probation agency.
Do not use, consume, or possess alcohol or illegal drugs; nor
associate with any persons using, possessing or consuming alcohol
or illegal drugs.
Do not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Submit to breath and/or urine testing for drugs or alcohol upon the
request of any law enforcement officer.
No spice, ivory wave or items of that nature.
Submit to random UA's and/or ETG testing.
Submit to search of person and/or property upon the request of any
law enforcement officer.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to possess alcohol nor frequent places where alcohol is the
chief item of sale.
Obtain a substance abuse evaluation and successfully complete any
recommended
Obtain
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school.and/or
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Obtain GED or high school diploma.
Submit to curfew, random UA's and ankle monitor if deemed necessary
by Adult Probation and Parole.
No contact with codefendants
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